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Momentous historical events, like the September 11 terrorist attacks
and the subsequent Terror War, test social theories and provide a
challenge to give a convincing account of the event and its
consequences. In the following analyses, I want first to suggest
how certain dominant social theories were put in question during
the momentous and world-shaking events of September 11, and
offer an analysis of the historical background necessary to understand
and contextualize the terror attacks. I take up the claim that
“everything has changed” in the wake of September 11 and attempt
to indicate both changes and continuities to avoid one-sided
exaggerations and ideological simplicities. I argue that the terror
attacks show contradictions in the nature of globalization and new
technology that requires dialectical analysis of these phenomena. I
conclude with some reflections on the implications of September
11 and the subsequent Afghanistan Terror War and 2003 war against
Iraq for critical social theory and democratic politics, envisaging a
new global movement against terrorism and militarism and for
democracy, peace, environmentalism, and social justice.
In the following study, I am using the term “Terror War” to describe
the Bush administration’s “war against terrorism” and its use of
unilateral military force and terror as the privileged vehicles of
constructing a U.S. hegemony in the current world (dis)order. The
Bush administration has expanded its combat against Islamic
terrorism into a policy of Terror War where they have declared the
right of the U.S. to strike any enemy state or organization presumed
to harbor or support terrorism, or to eliminate “weapons of mass
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destruction” that could be used against the U.S. The rightwing of
the Bush administration seeks to promote Terror War as the defining
struggle of the era, coded as an apocalyptic battle between good
and evil and has already mounted major military campaigns against
Afghanistan and Iraq, with highly ambiguous and unsettling results
(Kellner 2003).
Social Theory, Falsification, and the Events of History
Social theories generalize from past experience and provide accounts
of historical events or periods that attempt to map, illuminate, and
perhaps criticize dominant social relations, institutions, forms, trends,
and events of a given epoch. In turn, they can be judged by the
extent to which they account for, interpret, and critically assess
contemporary conditions, or predict future events or developments.
One major theory of the past two decades, Francis Fukuyama’s
The End of History (1992), was strongly put into question by the
events of September 11 and their aftermath. 2 For Fukuyama, the
collapse of Soviet communism and triumph of Western capitalism
and democracy in the early 1990s constituted “the end of history.”
This signified for him “the end point of mankind’s ideological
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as
the final form of human government.” Although there may be
conflicts in places like the Third World, overall for Fukuyama liberal
democracy and market capitalism have prevailed and future politics
will devolve around resolving routine economic and technical
problems, and the future will accordingly be rather mundane and
boring.
Samuel Huntington polemicizes against Fukuyama’s “one world:
euphoria and harmony” model in his The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order (1996). For Huntington, the
future holds a series of clashes between “the West and the Rest.”
Huntington rejects a number of models of contemporary history,
including a “realist” model that nation-states are primary players on
the world scene who will continue to form alliances and coalitions
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that will play themselves out in various conflicts. He also rejects a
“chaos” model that detects no discernible order or structure. Instead,
Huntington asserts that the contemporary world is articulated into
competing civilizations that are based on irreconcilably different
cultures and religions. For Huntington, culture provides unifying
and integrating principles of order and cohesion, and from dominant
cultural formations emerge civilizations that are likely to come into
conflict with each other, including Islam, China, Russia, and the
West. On Huntington’s model, religion is “perhaps the central force
that motivates and mobilizes people” and is thus the core of
civilization.
Although Huntington’s model seems to have some purchase in the
currently emerging global encounter with terrorism, and is becoming
a new dominant conservative ideology, it tends to overly homogenize
both Islam and the West, as well as the other civilizations he depicts.
As Tariq Ali argues (2002), Huntington exaggerates the role of religion,
while downplaying the importance of economics and politics.3
Moreover, Huntington’s model lends itself to pernicious misuse,
and has been deployed to call for and legitimate military retribution
against implacable adversarial civilizations by conservative
intellectuals like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Henry Kissinger, and members
of the Bush administration.
In sum, Huntington’s work provides too essentialist a model that
covers over contradictions and conflicts both within the West and
within Islam. Both worlds have been divided for centuries into dueling
countries, ethnic groups, religious fractions, and complex alliances
that have fought fierce wars against each other and that continue to
be divided geographically, politically, ideologically, and culturally
(see Ali 2002). Moreover, Huntington’s ideal type that contrasts
East and West, based on conflicting models of civilization, covers
over the extent to which Arab and Muslim culture preserved the
cultural traditions of the Greece and Rome during the Middle Ages
and thus played a major role in constituting Western culture.
Huntington downplays as well the extent to which Western science
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and technology were importantly anticipated and developed in the
Middle and Far East.
Furthermore, Islam itself is a contested terrain and in the current
situation there are important attempts to mobilize more moderate
forms of Islam and Islamic countries against Osama bin Laden’s Al
Qaeda terror network and Islamic extremism (see Ahmed 2003).
Hence, Huntington’s binary model of inexorable conflict between
the West and Islam is not only analytically problematic, but covers
over the crucial battle within Islam itself to define the role and
nature of religion in the contemporary world. It also decenters the
important challenge for the West to engage the Islamic world in a
productive dialogue about religion and modernity and to bring about
more peaceful, informed, and mutually beneficial relations between
the West and the Islamic world. Positing inexorable conflicts between
civilizations may well describe past history and present dangers,
but it does not help produce a better future and is thus normatively
and politically defective and dangerous.
Globalization includes a homogenizing neo-liberal market logic and
commodification, cultural interaction, and hybridization, as well as
conflict between corporations, nations, blocs, and cultures. Benjamin
Barber’s book McWorld vs. Jihad (1996) captures both the
homogenizing and conflictual elements of globalization. Barber
divides the world into a modernizing, homogenizing, Westernizing,
and secular forces of globalization, controlled by multinational
corporations, opposed to premodern, fundamentalist, and tribalizing
forces at war with the West and modernity. The provocative “Jihad”
in the title seems to grasp precisely the animus against the West in
Islamic extremism. But “Jihad” scholars argue that the term has a
complex history in Islam and often privilege the more spiritual senses
as a struggle for religion and spiritualization, or a struggle within
oneself for spiritual mastery. From this view, bin Laden’s
militarization of Jihad is itself a distortion of Islam that is contested
by its mainstream.4
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Barber’s model also oversimplifies present world divisions and
conflicts and does not adequately present the contradictions within
the West or the “Jihad” world, although he postulates a dialectical
interpenetrating of both forces and sees both as opposed to
democracy. His book does, however, point to problems and
limitations of globalization, noting dangerous conflicts and opponents,
unlike Thomas Friedman’s harmonizing duality of The Lexus and
the Olive (1999), which suggests that both poles of capitalist luxury
and premodern roots and tradition are parts of the globalization
process. In an ode to globalization, Friedman assumes the dual
victory of capitalism and democracy, a la Fukuyama, while Barber
demonstrates contradictions and tensions between capitalism and
democracy within the New World (Dis)Order, as well as the anti-
democratic animus of Jihad and sectors of McWorld.
Leading dualistic theories that posit a fundamental bifurcation
between the West and Islam are thus analytically suspicious in that
they homogenize complex civilizations and cover over differences,
hybridizations, contradictions, and conflicts within these cultures.
Positing inexorable clashes between bifurcated blocs a la Huntington
and Barber fails to illuminate specific discord within the opposing
spheres and the complex relations between them. These analyses
do not grasp the complexity in the current geopolitical situation,
which involves highly multifaceted and intricate interests, coalitions,
and conflicts that shift and evolve in response to changing situations
within an overdetermined and constantly evolving historical context.
As Tariq Ali points out (2002), dualistic models of clashes of
civilization also occlude the historical forces that clashed in the
September 11 attacks and the subsequent Terror War.
Consequently, the events of September 11 and their aftermath
suggest that critical social theory needs models that account for
complexity and the historical roots and vicissitudes of contemporary
problems like terrorism rather than bifurcated dualistic theories.
Critical social theory also needs to articulate how events like
September 11 produce novel historical configurations while
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articulating both changes and continuities in the present situation.5
It requires historical accounts of the contemporary origins of Islamic
radicalism and its complicity with U.S. imperialism, as I recount in
the next section. I suggest that Chalmers Johnson’s concept of
“blowback” (2000) provides a more convincing account than
dualistic (and duelistic!)  “war of civilization” discourses of the
September 11 terrorist attacks that better contextualizes, explains,
and even predicts such events. Moreover, a historicized “blowback”
model also provides cogent suggestions concerning viable and
inappropriate responses to global terrorism.
The causes of the September 11 events and their aftermath are
highly multifaceted and involve, for starters, the failure of U.S.
intelligence and the destructive consequences of U.S. interventionist
foreign policy since World War II and the failure to address the
Israeli-Palestinian crisis; U.S. policies since the late 1970s that
supported Islamic Jihadist forces against the Soviet Union in the
last days of the Cold War; and the failure to take terrorist threats
seriously and provide an adequate response. In other words, there
is no one cause or faction responsible for the 9/11 terror attacks,
but a wide range of responsibility to be ascribed. Taking account of
the history and complexity of the issues involved, Johnson’s model
of blowback (2000) provides a useful account of how U.S. policy
and institutions contributed to producing the most destructive terrorist
attacks on U.S. territory in history with destructive consequences
still threatening and unfolding.6
The Bush Administrations, the CIA, and Blowback
In retrospect, the events of September 11 can be seen as a textbook
example of “blowback,” a concept developed in a book with this
title by Chalmers Johnson (2000) who uses it to describe the
unintended consequences of aggressive military and covert policies,
a shorthand term for describing that a nation reaps what it sows. As
Johnson notes: “The term ‘blowback,’ which officials of the Central
Intelligence Agency first invented for their own internal use, is starting
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to circulate among students of international relations. It refers to
the unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from
the American people. What the daily press reports as the malign
acts of ‘terrorists’ or ‘drug lords’ or ‘rogue states’ or ‘illegal arms
merchants’ often turn out to be blowback from earlier operations”
(2000: 8). The concept of “blowback” can be applied to the
September 11 events since bin Laden and the radical Islamic forces
associated with the Al Qaeda network were supported, funded,
trained, and armed by the CIA and U.S. administrations in the late
1970s and 1980s. In this reading, the U.S.’s catastrophic failure
was not only to have not detected the danger of a terrorist attack on
the U.S. and taken action to prevent it, but to have actively
contributed to producing the groups who are implicated in the
September 11 abd other terrorist assaults on the U.S.
Johnson provides a wealth of examples of blowback from
problematic U.S. foreign policy maneuvers and covert actions which
had unintended consequences, as when the U.S. became associated
with support of terrorist groups or authoritarian regimes in Asia,
Latin America, or the Middle East, and its clients turned on their
sponsors. For instance, the U.S. helped overthrow a democratically
elected government in Iran and install the autocratic Shah. When
the Shah was overthrown in 1979, militants seized the U.S. embassy
and took its inhabitants hostage and since then has maintained hostile,
although intricate, relationships with the U.S.
In Johnson’s sense, September 11 is a classic example of blowback,
in which U.S. policies generated unintended consequences that had
catastrophic effects on U.S. citizens, New York, Washington, and
the American and indeed global economy. As I suggest in the
following analysis, U.S. policy in Afghanistan at the end of the Cold
War and to the present contributed to the heinous events of
September 11. A useful summary by Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey
St. Clair describes U.S. covert operations in Afghanistan in the late
1970s that had momentous consequences:
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In April of 1978 an indigenous populist coup overthrew the
government of Mohammed Daoud, who had formed an
alliance with the man the U.S. had installed in Iran, Reza
Pahlevi, a.k.a. the Shah. The new Afghan government was
led by Noor Mohammed Taraki, and the Taraki
administration embarked, albeit with a good deal of urban
intellectual arrogance on land reform, hence an attack on
the opium-growing feudal estates. Taraki went to the UN
where he managed to raise loans for crop substitution for
the poppy fields.
Taraki also tried to bear down on opium production in the
border areas held by fundamentalists, since the latter were
using opium revenues to finance attacks on Afghanistan’s
central government, which they regarded as an
unwholesome incarnation of modernity that allowed women
to go to school and outlawed arranged marriages and the
bride price. Accounts began to appear in the western press
along the lines of this from the Washington Post, to the
effect that the mujahedeen liked to “torture their victims
by first cutting off their noses, ears and genitals, then
removing one slice of skin after another.”
At that time the mujahedeen was not only getting money
from the CIA but from Libya’s Moammar Q’addaffi who
sent them $250,000. In the summer of 1979 the U.S. State
Department produced a memo making it clear how the
U.S. government saw the stakes, no matter how modern
minded Taraki might be or how feudal the Muj. It’s another
passage Nat might read to the grandkids: “The United
States’ larger interest would be served by the demise of the
Taraki-Amin regime, despite whatever set backs this might
mean for future social and economic reforms in Afghanistan.
The overthrow of the DRA [Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan] would show the rest of the world, particularly
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the Third World, that the Soviets’ view of the socialist course
of history being inevitable is not accurate.”7
In a 1998 Le Monde interview, President Jimmy Carter’s National
Security Advisor Zbignew Brzezinski had bragged about how he
conceived of arming Islam-extremist militants against the Afghan
government as a ploy to draw in the Soviet Union more deeply and
thus help destroy their system.8 What Brzezinksi proudly proclaimed
as his contribution to defeat the Soviet Union in the Cold War
appears in retrospect as a highly problematic U.S. intervention in
the late 1970s that intensified civil war in Afghanistan. Overthrow
of the secular and modernizing regime in Afghanistan by Islamic
fundamentalists helped mobilize and empower the forces that would
turn on the U.S. and institute a reign of global terrorism in the
current situation.
U.S. intervention in the Afghan conflict, that now appears as the
last great clash of the Cold War, helped create the context for the
current crisis. As a response to U.S. intervention, the Soviet Union
sent increased aid and personnel to prop up the moderate modernizing
Taraki regime that was opposed by Islamic fundamentalists in
Afghanistan. When Taraki was killed by Afghan army officers in
September 1979, the Soviets invaded in force in December 1979
and set up a government to avoid a fundamentalist Islamic and
U.S.-backed takeover.
In the 1980s, the U.S. began more aggressively supporting Islamic
fundamentalist Jihad groups and the Afghan project was a major
covert foreign policy project of the Reagan-Bush administration.
During this period, the CIA trained, armed, and financed precisely
those Islamic fundamentalist groups who later became part of the
Al Qaeda terror network who are now the nemesis of the West, the
new “evil empire.” In the battle to defeat Soviet Communism in the
Cold War, the U.S. poured billions of dollars into Afghanistan to
train “freedom fighters” that would overthrow the purportedly
communist regime. This was a major project with overt and covert
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aid from the U.S., Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, and other
countries. The military aid went into training and arming radical
Islamic groups who would emerge with a desire to fight other wars
for Islam in the countries that had earlier supported them in their
Jihad against the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan
administrations. These groups included Osama bin Laden and those
who would later form his Al Qaeda network.
Indeed, the blowback from the Reagan-Bush-CIA Afghanistan
intervention was astonishing. John K. Cooley in his important study
Unholy Wars. Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism)
(2000) documents the momentous consequences of the U.S. and
its allies sustaining the Islamists who fought to overthrow the Soviet-
backed government in Afghanistan. Egypt’s Anwar Sadat was an
early ally of the support for the Islamists against the Soviets and
was repaid with assassination by fanatic Islamics in 1981. Pakistan’s
president, Zia al-Haq, whose secret services played a major role in
arming and organizing the Islamic fighters in Afghanistan, was killed
in a mysterious plane crash in 1988 and more radical Islamic forces
have threatened to take over in Pakistan ever since. The Pakistani
secret services helped organize the group that became the Taliban
in the mid-1990s and the Taliban eventually took over control of
most of Afghanistan. The Taliban formed an alliance with bin Laden
and his Al Qaeda group, which used Afghanistan to form networks
that engaged in terrorism throughout the world. These Islamic
fundamentalists eventually turned on the U.S., one of the countries
that had helped to fund, train, and arm them.
Not only did the U.S. secret war in Afghanistan to organize Islamic
militia against the Soviets help create the Islamic terror network
that is now the scourge of the global world, but the same Islamic
radical forces, with the complicity of the CIA and other foreign
intelligence services, produced one the most stupendous proliferations
of drugs in history. As Cooley summarizes: “Never has so much
South Asian marijuana, opium, and semi-processed opium products
and heroin, reached the drug pushers, the adult addicts, the children,
11
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and the general populations of the West, as in the late 1990s. Much
of this was another direct consequence of the CIA’s holy war of
1979-89” (2000: 5). It is, of course, impossible to document how
much tonnage of drug products were exported, but while Afghanistan
produced mostly for local consumption before 1979, according to
UN figures production in 1995-1996 had risen to 2,6000 tons of
raw opium, increasing to 2,800 tons in 1997 (2000: 150). The results
were skyrocketing drug addiction in neighboring countries and
massive exporting of drugs to the West.
In 1989, Soviet troops left Afghanistan in defeat and a civil war
continued for the next several years. The first Bush administration,
in one of its most cynical and fateful decisions, decided to completely
pull out of Afghanistan, rather than working to build democracy
and a viable government in that country. In retrospect, this was
both inhumane and catastrophic. Over two million people had died
in the ten years of the Afghan war, the U.S. had invested billions of
dollars in overthrowing the Russian-sponsored regime and in arming,
training, and financing the Islamic fundamentalists. But rather than
help the Afghan people produce a viable government, the first Bush
administration turned away, and the most radical extremist Islamic
fundamentalist groups that the U.S. and Pakistanis had organized
took over the country after some years more of civil war, setting up
the present conflict (see Cooley 2000; Rashid 2001; and Ali 2002).
While later in the 1990s, certain U.S. interests would be attracted
to the oil and gas possibilities in Afghanistan and would cozy up to
and support the Taliban, in the early 1990s, the first Bush
administration had other fish to fry, in particular Iraq –- another
Bush I intervention that had momentous consequences. For after
arousing the Arab ire and opposition to the U.S. military intervention
against Iraq, at the end of the Gulf war in 1991, the Bush
administration persuaded the Saudi government to allow the U.S.
to continue to maintain military forces in the Holy Land of Islam.
This auspicious event has yet to be fully perceived in its blowback
effects. For it was the permanent positioning of U.S. troops in what
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was perceived as the Islamic Holy Land, Saudi Arabia, that especially
angered bin Laden and more radical Islamic groups (Kepel, 2002,
316). When Saudi Arabia continued to allow the presence of U.S.
troops after the Gulf war, bin Laden broke with his country and
was declared persona non grata by the Saudis for his provocative
statements and behavior. It was also reported at this time that Saudis
put out a contract on bin Laden’s life, supposedly with the assent of
the first Bush Administration (Weaver 1996) and later with the assent
of the Clinton administration, although assassination attempts
obviously failed, if they were seriously attempted at all.
After civil war in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, the Taliban
eventually took over control of much of the country (see Rashid
2001). The Taliban were recognized by the Saudis and Pakistanis
as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, but not by the UN and
much of the rest of the world, which recognized the Northern Alliance
groups fighting the Taliban as the legitimate representative of
Afghanistan. When bin Laden and his associates were expelled from
Sudan in 1996, they entered into a fateful association with the Taliban
and went to Afghanistan where they solidified their network,
developed training camps, and solicited recruits and financing (Kepel
2002).
The Clinton administration at first engaged the Taliban government
in dialogue, but soon broke off relations and failed to deal with the
bin Laden problem. For in the 1980s and 1990s, bin Laden
established an organization of former Afghanistan holy war veterans,
called Al Qaeda, “the host.”9  In February 1998, Al Qaeda issued a
statement, endorsed by several extreme Islamic groups, declaring it
the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens — civilian or military
— and their allies everywhere. The bombing of U.S. embassies in
Africa later in 1998 was ascribed to the bin Laden/Al Qaeda network,
and the Clinton administration responded by shooting 70 Cruise
missiles at a factory supposedly owned by bin Laden in Sudan that
produced chemical weapons and at camps in Afghanistan that
supposedly were populated by bin Laden and his group. The factory
13
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in Sudan turned out to be a pharmaceutical company and the camps
in Afghanistan were largely deserted, producing another
embarrassment for U.S. policy in the Middle East. Clinton later
claimed that his administration also was plotting to assassinate bin
Laden, but that a change of Pakistani government disrupted the
plot.10
Although this is rarely mentioned in the mainstream media, the
George W. Bush administration became one of the largest financial
supporters of the Taliban, providing over $100 million in early 2001
in what they described as “humanitarian aid,” as well as a
supplemental grant of $43 million in May of 2001 for the Taliban’s
promise to declare opium production “unIslamic” and thus to cut
back on a potent source of the world’s drug trade. Critics have
suggested that the Bush Administration was acting in the interests
of the Unocal oil consortium to build an oil-pipe line across
Afghanistan, and of the Enron corporation, a major contributor to
the Bush administration, which had done a feasibility study for the
project. Enron and Unocal had lavishly courted the Taliban and
encouraged U.S. support of the regime since they were deemed the
group most likely to stabilize Afghanistan and allow the pipeline to
be built.11
In Forbidden Truth, Brisard and Dasquie (2002) claim that under
the influence of oil companies, the Bush administration initially
blocked ongoing U.S. government investigations of terrorism, while
it bargained with the Taliban over oil rights and pipeline deals and
handing over bin Laden. This evidently led to the resignation of a
FBI deputy director, John O’Neill, who was one of the sources of
the story. Brisard and Guillaume contend that the Bush administration
had been a major supporter of the Taliban until the September 11
events and had blocked investigations in the bin Laden terror network.
Pursuing these leads, the British Independent reported on October
30: “Secret satellite phone calls between the State Department and
Mullah Mohammed Omar and the presentation of an Afghan carpet
to President George Bush were just part of the diplomatic contacts
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between Washington and the Taliban that continued until just days
before the attacks of 11 September.”
Thus, just as Bush senior turned on Saddam Hussein whom he
supported in the 1980s and 1990s, so too did Bush Junior turn on
the Taliban whom he had been generously sustaining, supposedly
with the hopes that his friends could do energy deals with them.
The Taliban, of course, were a highly theocratic and repressive
fundamentalist regime that some have described as “clerical fascism”
(Chip Berlet), or “reactionary tribalism” (Robert Antonio). Their
treatment of women was notorious, as was their cultural
totalitarianism that led to banning of books, media, destruction of
Buddhist statues, and other outrages (see Raschid 2001 and Kepel
2002).
The Taliban practice a form of Islam called “Deobandism,”
influenced by a 19th century sect that tried to purify Islam of its
modern aspects (see Rashid 2000: 88-90), much as the Saudis version
of “Wahabbism” followed strict Islamic law, while rejecting much
of the modern world. The Taliban went further than the Saudis in
trying to purify Islam in a particular anti-modern version, by following
an especially reactionary strain of Muslim fundamentalism, rejected
by the more mainstream Sunni and Shiite Islamic schools. The
Taliban have also been the host of Osama bin Laden and the Al
Qaeda network since they were expelled from Sudan in 1996, at
U.S. pressure and insistence. Although bin Laden and Al Qaeda
were designated enemies of the U.S. since their evident involvement
in a series of terrorist crimes, the Bush Administration continued to
provide support to the Taliban group that hosted and protected
them until the September 11 terror attacks.
Moreover, there has been a close relation between the Bush and
bin Laden families for generations. Salem bin Laden, head of the
family empire and Osama’s eldest brother, reportedly invested in
George W. Bush’s first business venture, Arbusto Energy. According
to several sources, the deal was brokered by Bush’s friend James
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Bath, who was also involved in the infamous BCCI bank scandals
and was allegedly a CIA agent recruited by W’s father, as well as a
business agent for the bin Laden family.12 The bin Laden family
has also been involved in other ventures with the Bush family.
Internet commentator Sally Slate cited an interesting passage from
a PBS Frontline Web-site on the bin Laden and Bush connection:
Like his father in 1968, Salem [bin Laden] died in a 1988
air crash . . . in Texas. He was flying a BAC 1–11 which
had been bought in July 1977 by Prince Mohammed Ben
Fahd. The plane’s flight plans had long been at the center
of a number of investigations. According to one of the plane’s
American pilots, it had been used in October 1980 during
secret Paris meetings between U.S. and Iranian emissaries.
Nothing was ever proven, but Salem bin Laden’s accidental
death revived some speculation that he might have been
“eliminated” as an embarrassing witness. In fact, an inquiry
was held to determine the exact circumstances of the
accident. The conclusions were never divulged.”13
This shocking report indicates that the Bush and bin Laden families
might have been involved in covert political activities, as well as
business deals, including the “October Surprise,” one of the most
controversial stories of the Reagan-Bush years. It has long been
claimed that representatives from the Reagan-Bush election team
in 1980 negotiated with Iranians to hold Americans hostage until
after the 1980 election, depriving then President Carter of an
“October Surprise” from release of the long-held U.S. hostages in
Iran that might give Carter the election.14 This story suggests the
longtime, secretive, and highly complex relations between the Bush
and the bin Laden families. It is highly suspicious that bin Laden’s
father and Salem bin Laden, whom had inherited control of the
family’s empire of business and political interests after his father’s
death both died in Texas airplane crashes. As I note below, the
Bush and bin Laden families were involved in many enterprises.
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Unraveling these threads will no doubt be one of the most important
and revealing tasks for future historians.
Whatever the bizarre and shady past relations between the Bush
and bin Laden family, it is striking that relations between the families
continued up until September 11. It has been widely reported that
the bin Laden family had been an investor in the Carlyle investment
group, in which James Baker and George H.W. Bush are major
partners.15 Moreover, Bush senior and the bin Ladens were allegedly
involved in the earlier major global scandal of its era, the Bank of
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) that funneled the money
of spies, criminals, shady businesses, and the CIA during the Reagan-
Bush era (see Brewton 1992; Cooley 2000; and Brisard and Dasquie
2002).
The official spin-line of Bush and bin Laden family spokespeople is
that the family has long expelled and condemned their wayward
son Osama and cannot be held responsible for Al Qaeda crimes.
But as Sally Slate notes: “Last Thursday on ABC’s Primetime,
Carmen bin Laden, the estranged wife of Osama’s brother Yeslam,
told Diane Sawyer, in regard to Osama’s standing in Saudi Arabia,
“What I have heard is he has the backing of some of the royal
family. They think the same way. Not all of them, but some of
them. You have to understand, I think in Saudi Arabia Osama bin
Laden has a little following. And in my opinion, this is what makes
him dangerous. . . . Because he has, I think, he has the backing of a
lot of people there.”16
Other commentators have claimed that the bin Laden/Al Qaeda
network has been supported by wealthy Saudis, including members
of bin Laden’s family, and that up until the September 11 terror
attacks, there were close connections between the Bush
administration, the Saudis, and the Taliban. A November 2001 PBS
Frontline on “The Saudi Time Bomb” made clear the support of
bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Al Qaeda network by Saudi Arabian
groups. It also revealed that many in the bin Laden Al Qaeda network
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and the Saudis shared a similar Wahabbi interpretation of Islam that
is rooted in an 18th century attempt to return to the early version of
Islam, is highly puritanical and repressive of women, and is
exceptionally hostile to the West. The Saudis helped fund the Taliban
and set up throughout the world fundamentalist Wahabbi Islamic
schools that became recruiting grounds for bin Laden and the Al
Qaeda network. Other Saudis directly contributed to Al Qaeda
through “charitable” foundations or other means.
Not only did the Bush family have a long and mysterious history of
dealings with the bin Laden and other dubious Saudi families who
funded the Al Qaeda network, but, as noted, Bush senior and friends
would strongly benefit from the war through their connections with
the Carlyle group which heavily invests in the military-defense sector
and include as investors the bin Laden family, election-thief and
Bush family friend James Baker, and George H.W. Bush, leading
the conservative Judicial Watch group to insist that Bush Senior
resign from the group because of conflict of interests. A shocking
FBI memo later revealed that the agency was ordered by the Bush
administration to stop investigating connections between the Al Qaeda
network and bin Laden family and to “lay off the bin Ladens,” no
doubt because of the longtime Bush/bin Laden family connections.17
The Bush-Baker-Cheney-Saudi band have, of course, long been
involved in Mid-East oil wheeling and dealing and assorted sordid
business deals and political intrigue in the area. Many believe that
the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan was at least partly motivated
by an interest in controlling the flow of Mid-East oil and enhancing
these business interests –- as was the last Bush-Cheney operation,
the Gulf War.18 Reports abound of the tremendous oil reserves in
Central Asia and the need to build pipelines across Afghanistan that
would secure passage. Using U.S. government sources, Michael
Klare writes that the Caspian Sea basin “harbors as much as 270
billion barrels of oil, or about one-fifth of the world’s total proven
reserves of petroleum. (Only the The Persian Gulf, with 675 billion
barrels in proven reserves, holds a larger supply.) The Department of
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Energy also estimates that the Caspian Sea region houses some 665
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, representing one-eight of the world’s
gas reserves” (Klare 2001: 2). Moreover, “the untapped oil of the Caspian
Sea basin…was estimated by the Department of State in 1997 to be
worth some $4 trillion” (Klare 2001: 15).
The oil-focused machinators in the Bush administration were focusing
on different ways to control the flow of Caspian Sea basin oil,
including pipelines that would be built across Afghanistan. The
desirability of secure terrain around the pipeline led, according to
some, to Bush administration support of the Taliban who had
promised to build the pipeline and create internal security to protect
it. But when it was obvious that the Taliban could not be trusted
and were involved with the bin Laden network and terrorism, Bush-
Cheney turned on their former allies, as did Bush senior-Cheney-
Powell against Saddam Hussein, whom had been a U.S. ally
throughout the 1980s and whom some believed came to power in
Iraq with CIA backing (see Kellner 1992).19
Of course, it would be a mistake to reduce events like the Gulf War
or Afghanistan Terror War to oil and one needs to factor in the
military interests, geopolitical goals, and specific agendas of the
various Bush administrations. Rather than providing causal analyses
that reduce complex events to one factor or dimension, issues like
the Gulf War (see Kellner 1992) or Afghan war require multifactored
analysis that includes economic, political, military, cultural, and other
relevant aspects.
In any case, the events of the September 11 terrorist attacks should
be seen in the context of several U.S. administrations and CIA
support for the perpetrators of the monstrous assaults on the United
States from the late 1970s, through the Reagan-Bush years, to the
present. This is not to simply blame U.S. policy in Afghanistan for
the terrorist assault of September 11, but it is to provide some of
the context in which the events can be interpreted. During the
hysterical fear of terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11
19
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and anthrax attacks, there was a surge of patriotism whereby many
argued that anyone who mentioned political causes of Arab hostility
toward the U.S. was part of the “blame America” crowd. Indeed,
even liberals resisted the “blowback” thesis as illicitly blaming the
victim. It is rather a question, first, of gaining historical understanding
of the context and situation concerning those radical Islamic sectors
of the Arab and Islamic world who have declared Jihad war against
the U.S. Secondly, it is a question of ascribing responsibility for
those in the U.S. foreign policy establishment who helped organize,
fund, train, and arm the terrorists now plaguing the U.S. If we do
not understand the past not only are we condemned to repeat it, but
we have no chance of constructing an intelligent, enlightened, and
peaceful future.
There are, of course, other aspects of U.S. foreign policy over the
past decades which have helped generate enemies of the United
States in the Middle East and elsewhere, such as excessive U.S.
support for Israel and inadequate aid for the Palestinians, U.S.
backing of authoritarian regimes, and innumerable misdeeds of the
U.S. empire over the past decades that have been documented by
Chomsky, Herman, Johnson, Vidal, and other critics of U.S. foreign
policy. Yet, while there were no doubt a multiplicity of contributing
factors, the September 11 events can be read as a blowback of
major policies of successive U.S. administrations and the CIA who
trained, funded, supported, and armed the cadres alleged to have
carried out the terrorist attacks on the United States.  The obvious
lesson is that it is highly dangerous and potentially costly to align
one’s country with terrorist cadres; that support of groups or
individuals who promote terrorism is likely to come back to haunt
you; and that it is hazardous to make Machiavellian pacts with
obviously brutal and treacherous forces in violent parts of the world..
Consequently, the conjuncture of Islamic radicalism with the failure
of subsequent U.S. administrations to take seriously the threats that
terrorist groups posed helped to make possible the September 11
terrorist attacks on the U.S., as did the failure of U.S. intelligence
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agencies. More specifically, the Bush administration downplayed
the threats of terrorism. An explosive article by Michael Hirsch and
Michael Isikoff on “What Went Wrong” published in the May 28
Newsweek, however, contained a series of revelations of how the
Bush administration had missed signals of an impending attack and
systematically weakened U.S. defenses against terrorism and the
bin Laden network. According to the Newsweek story, the Clinton
administration national security advisor Sandy Berger had become
“’totally preoccupied’ with fears of a domestic terror attack and
tried to warn Bush’s new national security advisor Condoleezza
Rice of the dangers of a bin Laden attack.” But while Rice ordered
a security review “the effort was marginalized and scarcely
mentioned in ensuing months as the administration committed itself
to other priorities, like National Missile Defense (NMD [i.e. National
Missile Defense]) and Iraq.”
Moreover, Newsweek reported that John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney
General, was eager to set a new rightwing law and order agenda
and was not focused on the dangers of terrorism, while other Bush
administration high officials also had their ideological agendas to
pursue at the expense of protecting the country against terror attacks.
Ashcroft reportedly shut down wiretaps of Al Qaeda-related suspects
connected to the 1998 bombing of African embassies and cut $58
million from a FBI request for an increase in its anti-terrorism budget
(while at the same time switching from commercial to government
jets for his own personal flight). On September 10, when Ashcroft
sent a request for budget increases to the White House, it covered
68 programs, none of them related to counter-terrorism. Nor was
counter-terrorism in a memorandum he sent to his heads of
departments stating his seven priorities. According to Newsweek, in
a meeting with FBI chief Louis Freeh, he rebuffed Freeh’s warnings
to take terrorism seriously and turned down a FBI request for
hundreds of additional agents to be assigned to tracking terrorists.20
In the Newsweek summary:
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It wasn’t that Ashcroft and others were unconcerned about
these problems, or about terrorism. But the Bushies had an
ideological agenda of their own. At the Treasury Department,
Secretary Paul O’Neill’s team wanted to roll back almost
all forms of government intervention, including laws against
money laundering and tax havens of the kind used by terror
groups. At the Pentagon, Donald Rumsfeld wanted to
revamp the military and push his pet project, NMD.
Rumsfeld vetoed a request to divert $800 million from
missile defense into counterterrorism. The Pentagon chief
also seemed uninterested in a tactic for observing bin Laden
left over from the Clinton administration: the CIA’s Predator
surveillance plane. Upon leaving office, the Clintonites left
open the possibility of sending the Predator back up armed
with Hellfire missiles, which were tested in February 2001.
But through the spring and summer of 2001, when valuable
intelligence could have been gathered, the Bush
administration never launched even an unarmed Predator.
Hill sources say DOD [Department of Defense] didn’t want
the CIA treading on its turf.
A Time magazine cover story later in the summer by Michael Elliot,
“The Secret History” (Aug. 4, 2002), provides more detail
concerning how the Clinton administration had together a program
to attack Al Qaeda in November 2001, when the contested election
battle in Florida was raging. The Clinton administration was not
able to implement the plan, however, because: “With less than a
month left in office, they did not think it appropriate to launch a
major initiative against Osama bin Laden.” Clinton administration
officials claim that Bush’s National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice was fully informed of this plan, and that Clinton National
Security Advisor Sandy Berger stressed the need for a major initiative
against bin Laden and Al Qaeda, but nothing was done. Moreover,
the head of anti-terrorist operations in the Clinton administration,
Richard Clarke, who stayed on for the Bush administration, had
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himself drawn up the plan and urged its implementation when the
Bush team took office. According to Time:
Clarke’s proposals called for the ‘breakup’ of Al Qaeda
cells and the arrest of their personnel. The financial support
for its terrorist activities would be systematically attacked,
its assets frozen, its funding from fake charities stopped.
Nations where Al Qaeda was causing trouble —- Uzbekistan,
the Philippines, Yeman  –- would be given aid to fight the
terrorists. Most important, Clarke wanted to see a dramatic
increase in covert action in Afghanistan to ‘eliminate the
sanctuary’ where Al Qaeda had its terrorist training camps
and bin Laden was being protected by the radical Islamic
Taliban regime… In the words of a senior Bush
administration official, the proposals amounted to
‘emervything we’ve done since 9/11.
Unfortunately, fighting terrorism was not a priority in the Bush
administration that was hell bent in pushing through its rightwing
and procorporate agenda, and so the plan for attacks on Al Qaeda
went through the usual 1001 layers of bureaucracy, finally reaching
Bush and his inner circle in early September, too late to prevent the
September 11 attacks. As these revelations unfolded in summer
2002, Democrats and others called for blue-ribbon commissions to
study intelligence and policy failures that made possible the
September 11 terrorist attacks. Republicans, led by Vice-President
Dick Cheney, predictably attacked the patriotism of anyone who
ascribed blame to the U.S. government concerning the September
11 attacks. Moreover, according to Democratic Senate Majority
leader Tom Daschle, Cheney had repeatedly urged him not to hold
hearings on U.S. policies or failures that led to the September 11
attacks. Bush administration spokespeople attacked as well California
Senator Dianne Feinstein who retorted in a memo:
I was deeply concerned as to whether our house was in
order to prevent a terrorist attack. My work on the
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Intelligence Committee and as chair of the Technology and
Terrorism Subcommittee had given me a sense of foreboding
for some time. I had no specific data leading to a possible
attack.
In fact, I was so concerned that I contacted Vice President
Cheney’s office that same month [i.e. July 2001] to urge
that he restructure our counter-terrorism and homeland
defense programs to ensure better accountability and prevent
important intelligence information from slipping through the
cracks.
Despite repeated efforts by myself and staff, the White
House did not address my request. I followed this up last
September 2001 before the attacks and was told by
‘Scooter’ Libby that it might be another six months before
he would be able to review the material. I told him I did not
believe we had six months to wait.21
This is highly shocking and calls attention to the key responsibility
of Vice President Dick Cheney in failing to produce an adequate
response to the dangers of terrorism. A year previous, in May 2001,
the Bush administration announced that “Vice-President Dick Cheney
is point man for [the Bush] administration… on three major issues:
energy, Global warming, and domestic terrorism.” On a May 19,
2002 Meet the Press, Cheney acknowledged that he had been
appointed head of a Bush administration task force on terrorism
before September 11, and claimed that he had some meetings on
the topic. Yet Cheney and others in the Bush administration seemed
to disregard several major reports that cited the dangers of terrorist
attacks, including congressional reports by former Senators Gary
Hart and Howard Rudman in early 2001 that had called for a
centralization of information on terrorism, but it appeared that the
Bush administration failed to act on these recommendations.
Obviously, Cheney concentrated on energy issues, to the detriment
of paying attention to terrorism and should thus be held in part
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responsible for Bush administration ignoring of pre-September 11
terrorist threats.22
As I write in summer 2003, so far the Bush administration has
blocked serious investigations into U.S. government failure to stop
the September 11 terror attacks and it remains to be seen if such
investigations will ever be carried out. In any case, there is no doubt
that but the September 11 attacks were one of most significant
events of recent history and in the next section I will discuss some
aspects of what it tells us about contemporary society, globalization,
and the present moment.
September 11 and Terror War: Has Everything Changed?
In the aftermath of September 11, there was a wealth of commentary
arguing that “everything has changed,” that the post-September 11
world is a different one, less innocent, more serious, and significantly
altered, with momentous modifications in the economy, polity,
culture and everyday life. There were some doubters such as
historian Alan Brinkley who stated in a New York Times interview
(Sept. 14, 2002): “I’m skeptical that this is a great rupture in the
fabric of history.”23  Time alone will tell the depth of the magnitude
of change, but there are enough significant shifts that have occurred
already to see September 11 as a transformational event that has
created some dramatic alterations in both the U.S. and global society,
signaling reconfigurations and novelties in the current world.
In the context of U.S. politics, September 11 was so far-reaching
and catastrophic that it flipped the political world upside down, put
new issues on the agenda, and changed the political, cultural, and
economic climate almost completely overnight. To begin, there was
a dramatic reversal of the fortunes of George W. Bush and the
Bush administration. Before September 11, Bush’s popularity was
rapidly declining. After several months of the most breathtaking
hardright turn perhaps ever seen in U.S. politics, Bush seemed to
lose control of the agenda with the defection of Vermont Republican
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Senator Jim Jeffords to the Democratic Party in May 2001. Jeffords’
defection gave the Democrats a razor-thin control of Congress and
the ability to block Bush’s programs and to advance their own (see
Kellner 2001, Chapter Eleven). Bush seemed disengaged after this
setback, spending more and more time at his Texas ranch. He was
widely perceived as incompetent and unqualified, and his public
support was seriously eroding.
With the terror attacks of September 11, however, the bitter
partisanship of the previous months disappeared and Bush was the
beneficiary of a extraordinary outburst of patriotism. Support for
the Bush administration was strongly fuelled by the media that
provided 24/7 coverage of the heroism of the fireman, police, and
rescue workers at the World Trade Center. The response of ordinary
citizens to the tragedy showed American courage, skill, and dedication
at its best, as rescue workers heroically struggled to save lives and
deal with the immense problems of removing the Trade Center
ruins. New York City and the country pulled together in a remarkable
display of community, heroism, and resolve, focused on in the
ongoing media coverage of the tragedy. There was an explosion of
flags and patriotism and widespread desire for military retaliation,
fanned by the media.
The U.S. media’s demonizing coverage of bin Laden and his Al
Qaeda network of terrorists and constant demand for strong military
retaliation precluded developing broader coalitions and more global
and less militarist approaches to the problem of terrorism. The
anthrax attacks, unsolved as I write in summer 2003, fueled media
hysteria and mass panic that terrorism could strike anyone at any
time and any place. Bush articulated the escalating patriotism,
vilification of the terrorists, and the demand for stern military
retaliation, and a frightened nation supported his policies, often
without seeing their broader implications and threat to democracy
and world peace.
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There was a brief and ironical ideological flip-flop of Bush
administration policy, in which it temporarily put aside the
unilateralism that had distinguished its first months in office in favor
of a multilateral approach. As the Bush administration scrambled to
assemble a global coalition against terrorism with partners such as
Pakistan, China, and Russia, that it had previously ignored or in the
case of China even provoked, illusions circulated that the U.S. would
pursue a more multilateral global politics. Yet the U.S. largely chose
to fight the Afghanistan war itself, eschewing NATO, UN, or other
multilateral support. One could indeed argue that the failures of the
Afghan intervention to capture bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and other
top Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership was a result of the U.S. choosing
a unilateral military policy rather than a more multilateral approach
(see Kellner 2003b).
With the collapse of the Taliban and the defacto conclusion of the
intense military phase of the Afghanistan Terror War by December
2001, morover, the Bush administration intensified its unilateral
approach and only many months later invited in a more multilateral
policing force. Moreover, the Bush doctrine articulated in his January
2002 State of the Union address projected an “axis of evil”
threatened by U.S. military action, called for unprecedented military
action and build-up, and evoked an image of an era of war via U.S.
military intervention throughout the world for the foreseeable future.
The threat of a new militarism as the defining feature of the Bush
era was intensified as his administration came to formulate his
doctrine of “preemptive strikes” during the summer of 2002 and
the Bush and Blair largely unilateral war against Iraq in April 2003.
Previous to September 11, the Bush administration had been rabidly
pro “free markets” and anti-government, and it was forced by the
September 11 events to recognize the need for stronger government
programs. There was widespread consensus that federal funds and
programs were necessary to help rebuild New York, provide
increased domestic security, and regulate industries like the airplane
business, which showed itself to be woefully lacking in security
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measures. Yet it should be noted that the main government
interventions undertaken by the Bush administration were in the
areas of “homeland security” and a gigantic military build-up. These
included a highly illiberal rightwing law and order program of
unleashing government agencies to surveil, arrest, and detain those
suspected of being terrorists in what many see as the most outrageous
assault on civil liberties and the open society in U.S. history. There
have been no serious initiatives in the area of investing to rebuild
infrastructure of cities, highways, or the public health system.
Moreover, Bush’s proposed “economic stimulus” package largely
consisted of tax breaks for the wealthy rather than new government
programs to help the poor and those losing their jobs during a severe
economic downturn.
Moreover, government bailouts went mainly to Bush administration
allies such as the airlines industry with no funds for job retraining
and support for workers laid-off. Hence, although September 11
created an amazing reversal of fortune for George W. Bush, it has
so far not produced any fundamental restructuring of the U.S.
economy or polity, outside of rightwing law and order programs
and tightened airport and domestic security. The September 11 terror
attacks and subsequent anthrax attacks did, however, point to a
vulnerability to terrorism and danger not previously experienced by
Americans on U.S. soil.
The new vulnerability caused a reversal of priorities, both national
and personal, for many people, and made it clear that the U.S. had
to address problems of globalization and terrorism — issues that
were far from the hearts and minds of the average U.S. citizen. For
a while, irony was out and seriousness was in, and a new sobriety
replaced the usual American concern with triviality and diversion.
Americans, like people in most of the world, had to learn to live
with finitude, contingency, risk, and other concepts that were
previously philosophical categories and were now realities of
everyday life. There was a sudden sense that everything could change
within days or weeks, and that technologies which were part and
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parcel of everyday life, such as airplanes or mail delivery, could be
weapons of destruction. Furthermore, fears proliferated that
technological weapons of mass destruction threatened Americans
anywhere and anytime, creating new forms of insecurity and anxiety
which the media fuelled with hysteric coverage of the anthrax
attacks, endless accounts of terrorist networks, and highly dramatized
reports of the Afghanistan Terror War.
Crucially, the September 11 events dramatized that globalization is
a defining reality of our time and that the much-celebrated flow of
people, ideas, technology, media, and goods could have a down
side as well as an upside, and expensive costs as well as benefits.
The 9/11 terror attacks also call attention to the complex and
unpredictable nature of a globally-connected networked society and
the paradoxes, surprises, and unintended consequences that flow
from the multidimensional processes of globalization. Al Qaeda
presented an example of a hidden and secretive decentered network
dedicated to attacking the U.S. and their Afghanistan base represented
what theorists called “wild zones” or “zones of turmoil” that existed
out of the boundaries of “safe zones” of globalized metropoles like
Wall Street and Northern Virginia (see Mann 2001 and Urry 2002).
Globalization thus generates its Other, its opponents, just as it
destroys tradition and incorporates otherness into its modernizing
and neo-liberal market.
For the first time, the American people were obliged to perceive
that it had serious enemies throughout the globe and that global
problems had to be addressed. No longer could the U.S. enjoy the
luxury of isolationism, but was forced to actively define its role
within a dangerous and complex global environment. Moreover, the
terror attacks of 9/11 put in question much conventional wisdom and
forced U.S. citizens and others to reflect upon the continued viability of
key values, practices, and institutions of a democratic society. In
particular, the events of September 11 force the rethinking of
globalization, new technology, democracy, and national and global
security. 9/11 and its aftermath demonstrate the significance of
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globalization and the ways that global, national, and local scenes and
events intersect in the contemporary world. The terror spectacle also
pointed to the fundamental contradictions and ambiguities of
globalization, undermining one-sided pro or anti-globalization positions.
9/11 was obviously a global event that dramatized an interconnected
and conflicted networked society where there is a constant worldwide
flow of people, products, technologies, ideas and the like. September
11 could only be a mega-event in a global media world, a society
of the spectacle (Debord 1970), where the whole world is watching
and participates in what Marshall McLuhan (1964) called a global
village. The 9/11 terror spectacle was obviously constructed as a
media event to circulate terror and to demonstrate to the world the
vulnerability of the epicenter of global capitalism and American
power.
Thus, September 11 dramatized the interconnected networked globe
and the important role of the media in which individuals everywhere
can simultaneously watch events of global significance unfold and
participate in the dramas of globalization. Already, Bill Clinton had
said before September 11 that terrorism is the downside, the dark
side, of globalization, and after 9/11 Colin Powell interpreted the
terrorist attacks in similar fashion. Worldwide terrorism is threatening
in part because globalization relentlessly divides the world into have
and have-nots, promotes conflicts and competition, and fuels long
simmering hatreds and grievances -– as well as bringing people
together, creating new relations and interactions, and new hybridities.
This is the objective ambiguity of globalization that both brings
people together and brings them into conflict, that creates social
interaction and inclusion, as well as hostilities and exclusions, and
that potentially tears regions and the world apart while attempting
to pull things together. Moreover, as different groups gain access to
technologies of destruction and devise plans to make conventional
technologies, like the airplane, instruments of destruction then
dangers of unexpected terror events, any place and any time
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proliferate and become part of the frightening mediascape of the
new millennium.
Globalization is thus messier and more dangerous than previous
theories had indicated. Moreover, global terrorism and megaspectacle
terror events are possible because of the lethality and power of new
technology, and its availability to groups and individuals that
previously had restricted access. In a perverted distortion of Andrew
Feenberg’s theory of the reconstruction and democratization of
technology (1999, 2001), terrorist groups seek technologies of mass
destruction in the past monopolized by the state and take instruments
of mass transportation and communication run by corporations and
the state, like airlines and mail delivery, and reconvert these
instruments into weapons of mass destruction, or at least of mass
terror. I might parenthetically note here the etymology of the term
terrorism, which, according to most scholars, derives from the Latin
verb terrere, “to cause to tremble or quiver.” It began to be used
during the French Revolution, and especially after the fall of
Robespierre and the “reign of terror,” or simply, “the Terror” in
which enemies of the revolution were subjected to imprisonment,
torture and beheading, the first of many modern examples of state
terrorism.
Hence, September 11 exhibited a technological terror that converts
benign instruments like airlines and buildings into instruments of
mass destruction. Within a short time after the 911 terror attacks, in
early October, the mail system was polluted by anthrax. Since infected
letters were sent to politicians and corporate media, there was
maximum public attention on the dangers on a lethal anthrax attack,
making postal work, mail delivery, and the opening of mail a traumatic
event, infused with fear. This is exactly the goal of terrorism and
media hysteria over anthrax attacks went far in promoting war fever
and hysterical fear that led the public to unquestionably support
whatever military retaliation, or domestic politics, the Bush
administration choose to exert. Curiously, while the Bush
administration seemed at first to blame the Al Qaeda network and
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then Iraq for the anthrax attacks, it appears that the military high
grade of anthrax has the genetic footprint of U.S. laboratories in
Fort Detrick Maryland. But eventually the FBI and academic experts
believe the source of the attacks was an individual working for the
U.S. defense and biological weapons establishment (see note 11).
It is clear from September 11 that the new technologies disperse
power, empowering angry disempowered people, leveling the playing
field and distributing the use and application of information
technology and some technologies of mass destruction. Many military
technologies can be obtained by individuals and groups to use against
the superpowers and the access to such technology produces a
situation of asymmetrical war where weaker individuals and groups
can go after superpowers. The possibility of new forms of cyberwar,
and terrorist threats from chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons,
creates new vulnerabilities in the national defense of the overdeveloped
countries and provides opportunities for weaker nations or groups to
attack stronger ones. Journalist William Greider, for instance, author of
Fortress America: The American Military and the Consequences of
Peace, claims that: “A deadly irony is embedded in the potential of
these new technologies. Smaller, poorer nations may be able to defend
themselves on the cheap against the intrusion of America’s overwhelming
military strength” (abcsnew.com, 11/01/99) — or exercise deadly
terrorism against civilian populations.
Hence, the U.S. discovered that it is vulnerable domestically to terrorist
attack. Likewise, it is becoming clear that the more technologically
advanced a society is, the more vulnerable it is to cyberwar. There are
now, of course, serious worries about the Internet and cyberterrorism
disrupting the global economy and networked society. It is somewhat
strange that terrorist groups have not, in fact, gone after the Internet,
and attempted to shut it down since they were obviously attempting
to disrupt global business by attacking the World Trade Center and
airlines industry. Already Paul Virilio evoked the frightening possibility
of the collapse of the Internet through a major technological “event”
Social Thought & Research
32
that would cause its shutdown —- disruptions previewed by hacker
attacks, worms, and viruses over the past years.24
Rather, the Al Qaeda terror network used the Internet, as it used
globalization, to move its communication, money, people,
propaganda, and terror. Curiously, then, September 11 dramatizes
that all of the most positive aspects of globalization and new
technology can be turned against the U.S., or, in general, positive
aspects of globalization can turn into their opposite, as in Adorno
and Horkheimer’s “dialectic of Enlightenment” in which reason,
science, technology, and other instruments of Enlightenment turned
into their opposites in the hands of German fascism and other
oppressive social groups (1972 [1946]). For globalization makes
possible global terror networks as well as networks of commerce
and communication. The circulation of commodities, technologies,
ideas, money and people can facilitate networks of terror, as well as
trade and travel. The Internet makes possible the spreading of hate
and terror, as well as knowledge and culture. Computers can be an
integral part of a terror network just as they are part of businesses
everywhere and many of our own everyday lives. And biotechnology,
which promises such extravagant medical advances and miracles,
can provide weapons of mass destruction, as well as medicines and
positive forces.
Thus, September 11 and its aftermath exhibits the contradictions
and ambiguities of globalization, the Internet, biotechnology, and
technology in general in the contemporary age. Globalization has
upsides and downsides, costs and benefits, which are often
interconnected, and is consequently intrinsically ambiguous. New
technologies can be used positively or negatively and in fact are at
once potentially empowering and productive and disempowering
and destructive, and are thus fraught with contradictions. Often,
the positives and negatives of globalization and new technology are
intertwined, as when the free and open society enabled the free
movement of terrorists; the open architecture of the Internet enabled
terrorists to communicate, circulate money, and organize their terror
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attacks; and the networked society of globalization, with its dark
sides, enabled terrorists to attack the very symbols of American
global wealth and power.
Certainly bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network represents bad globalization,
most would agree, and the perverted use of technology. But in a
sense the Al Qaeda Jihad is the reverse image of McWorld, which
imposes its Jihad on tradition and local culture, wanting to create
the world in its image. Just as Al Qaeda dreams of imposing a
radical premodern Islam on the world, taking over and destroying
Western infidel culture and imposing a homogenized Islamic
fundamentalism, so too does McDonald’s want to destroy local and
traditional eating habits and cuisine and replace them with a
globalized and universalized menu.
Hence, whereas theories of globalization, the Internet, and
cyberculture tended to be on the whole one-sided, either pro or
con, September 11 and its aftermath showed the objective ambiguity
and contradictions of these phenomena and need for a more
dialectical and contextualizing optic. On one hand, the events showed
the fundamental interdependence of the world, dramatizing how
activities in one part of the world effected others and the need for
more global consciousness and politics. September 11 exposed the
dangers and weaknesses inherent in constructions of Fortress
America, and the untenability of isolationism and unilateralist
policies. It made evident that we are in a global world with global
problems, which require global solutions. On the other hand, as the
Bush administration pursued increasingly unilateralist policies after
seeming to make gestures toward a multilateralist response, the
aftermath of September 11 shows the limited possibilities for a single
nation to impose its will on the world and to dominate the complex
environment of the world economy and politics.
September 11 also revealed the failures of the laissez-faire conservative
economics, which claimed that there was a market solution to every
problem. Just as Grand Theft 2000 revealed the failure of voting
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technology, the voting registration process, the very system of voting,
as well as the failure of the media and judicial system (see Kellner
2001), so too did September 11 reveal the massive failure of U.S.
intelligence agencies, the National Security State, and the U.S.
government to protect the people in the country, as well as cities and
monuments, against terrorist attack. The privatization undergone by
the airlines industry left travelers vulnerable to the hijacking of airplanes;
the confused and ineffectual response by the federal government to the
anthrax attacks uncovered the necessity of a better public health system,
as well as more protection and security against terrorist attacks. Going
after the terror networks disclosed the need for tighter financial regulation,
better legal and police coordination, and an improved intelligence and
national security apparatus. Rebuilding New York City and the lives of
those affected by the terror attacks showed the need for a beneficent
welfare state that would provide for its citizens in their time of need.
Thus, September 11 ends the fantasies of Reagan-Bush conservative
economics that the market alone can solve all social problems and
provide the best mechanism for every industry and sector of life. The
Bush-Enron scandals also reveal the utter failures of neo-liberalism and
the need for a stronger and more effective polity for the U.S. to compete
and survive in a highly complex world economy and polity (see Kellner
2003b, Chapter 9).
On the whole, September 11 and its aftermath have made the world a
much more dangerous place. Regional conflicts from the Israel-Palestine
hostilities in the Middle East to India-Pakistan conflict to discord in
Africa, the Philippines, Columbia, and elsewhere have used Bush
administration discourse against terrorism to suppress human rights, to
legitimate government oppression, and to kill political opponents
throughout the world. Bush administration unilateralism in pursuing the
war against terror throughout the world, including against an imagined
“axis of evil” not directly related to the Al Qaeda terror network, has
weakened multilateral agreements and forces from NATO to the UN
and has increased collective insecurity immensely. The Bush
administration polarizing policy of “you are with us or against us” has
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divided alliances, is ever more isolating the U.S. and is producing a
more polarized and conflicted world. The alarming build-up of U.S.
military power is escalating a new militarism and producing proliferating
enemies and resentment against the U.S., now being increasingly seen
as a rogue superpower. Finally, aggressive U.S. military action throughout
the world, failed propaganda in the Arab world, and what is perceived
as growing U.S. arrogance and belligerence is producing more enemies
in the Arab world and elsewhere that will no doubt create dangerous
blowback effects in the future.
Not only has Bush administration unilateralist foreign policy endangered
the U.S. to new attacks and enemies, but Bush administration domestic
policy has also weakened democracy, civil liberties, and the very concept
of a free and open society. Draconian anti-terror laws embodied in the
so-called “USA Patriot Act” have immeasurably increased government
powers of surveillance, arrest, and detention. The erection of military
prison camps for suspected terrorists, the abrogation of basic civil liberties,
and the call for military trials undermines decades of progress in
developing a democratic policy, producing the most regressive U.S.
domestic policies in history.
Bush administration economic policy has also done little to strengthen
the “new economy,” largely giving favors to its major contributors in
the oil, energy, and military industries. Bush administration censorship
of Web-sites, e-mail and wireless communication, refusal to release
government documents, and curtailment of the information freedom
act signals the decline of the information society and perhaps of a free
and open democratic society. Traditional Bush family secrecy explains
part of the extreme assaults on open flow of information and freedom,
but there are also signs that key members of the Bush administration
are contemptuous of democracy itself and threaten to drastically cut
back democratic rights and freedoms.
Thus, Bush administration policy has arguably exploited the tragedy of
September 11 for promoting its own political agenda and interests and
threatens to undermine the U.S. and world economy and American
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democracy in the process. September 11 thus represents a clear and
present danger to the U.S. economy and democracy as well as the
threat of terror attacks. Of course, many people lost loved ones in the
September 11 terror attacks and their lives will never be the same.
Other individuals have returned to the routines and patterns of their
pre-September 11 life, and there are thus continuities in culture and
everyday life as well as differences and changes. It is not clear if there
will be a significant and lasting resurgence of civic re-engagement, but
more people now realize that global politics are now perceived as highly
significant and that there should be more focus and debates on this
terrain than previously.
Still, many corporate and political interests and individual citizens
pursue business as usual at the same time that significant differences
are enforced in the economy and politics. There are, however,
intelligent and destructive ways to fight global terrorism and such a
virulent global problem requires a global and multilateral solution,
demanding alliances of a complex array of countries on the legal,
police, economic, and military front. In this global context, there
are serious dangers that the Bush administration will make the
problem of terrorism worse and will immeasurably weaken the U.S.
and the global economy and polity in the process. In the name of
containing terrorism, the Bush administration is both championing
curtailment of civil liberties and the public sphere domestically and
promoting military solutions to terrorism which legitimates other
repressive regimes to suppress human rights and democracy and to
themselves use military and police methods to deal with their respective
regime’s opponents and critics –- as was evident in the India-Pakistan
dispute, the intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and
numerous other actions around the world following the Bush
administration Afghanistan intervention.25 In this situation, it is now
becoming increasingly important to seek global solutions to global
problems, to defend democracy and social justice, and to criticize
both militarism and terrorism.
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For Democracy and Against Terrorism and Militarism
In conclusion, I want to argue that in the light of the Bush
administration attacks on democracy and the public sphere in the
United States and elsewhere in the name of a war against terrorism,
there should be a strong reaffirmation of the basic values and
institutions of democracy and a call for global solutions to global
problems. Progressive social movements should thus struggle against
terrorism, militarism, and social injustice and for democracy, peace,
environmentalism, human rights, and social justice. Rather than
curtailing democracy in the naming of fighting terrorism we need to
strengthen democracy in the name of its survival and indeed the
survival of the planet against the forces of violence and destruction.
Rather than absolve Bush administration domestic and foreign policy
from criticism in the name of patriotism and national unity, as the
administration’s supporters demand, we need more than ever a
critical dialogue on how to defeat terrorism and how to strengthen
democracy throughout the world.
Democracy is in part a dialogue that requires dissent and debate as
well as consensus. Those who believe in democracy should oppose
all attempts to curtail democratic rights and liberties and a free and
open public sphere. Democracy also involves the cultivation of
oppositional public spheres and as in the 1960s on a global scale
there should be a resurrection of the local, national, and global
movements for social transformation that emerged as a reaction to
war and injustice in the earlier era. This is not to call for a return to
the 1960s, but for the rebirth of a global movement for peace and
justice that builds on the lessons of the past as it engages the realities
of the present.
In addition to re-affirming democracy, we should be against terrorism
and militarism. This is not to argue for an utopic pacifism, but to
argue against militarism in the sense that the military is offered as
the privileged solution to the problem of terrorism and in which the
military is significantly expanded, as in the Bush administration
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massive military build-up, and promotion of unilateral military action.
Thus, while I would argue that military action against terrorism is
legitimate, I would oppose U.S. unilateralism militarism outside of
the bounds of recognized military conventions and law, and would
favor more multilateral action in the context of global law and
coalitions.
There is little doubt that that the Bin Laden and Al Qaeda terrorists
are highly fanatical and religious in their ideology and actions, of a
sort hard to comprehend by Western categories. In their drive for
an apocalyptic Jihad, they believe that their goals will be furthered
by creating chaos, especially war between radical Islam and the
West. Obviously, dialogue is not possible with such groups, but
equally as certain an overreactive military response that causes a
large number of innocent civilian deaths in a Muslim country could
trigger precisely such an apocalyptic explosion of violence as was
dreamed of by the fanatic terrorists. It would seem that such a
retaliatory response was desired by the Bin Laden group which
carried out the terrorist attacks on the U.S. Thus, to continue to
attack Arab and Islamic countries could be to fall into the Bin Laden
gang’s trap and play their game—with highly dangerous
consequences.
Further, we need to reflect on the global economic, social,
environmental and other consequences of promoting militarism and
an era of warfare against terrorism. Evoking and fighting an “axis
of evil” called for by the Bush administration is highly dangerous,
irrational, and potentially apocalyptic. It is not clear that the global
economy can survive constant disruption of warfare. Nor can the
environment stand constant bombardment and warfare, when
ecological survival is already threatened by unrestrained capitalist
development (see Wilson 2002). To carry out continued military
intervention, whether against an “axis of evil” or any country that is
said to support terrorism by the Bush administration, risks
apocalypse of the most frightening kind. Continued large-scale
bombing of Iraq, Iran, Syria or any Arab countries, especially after
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growing anger following the U.S./U.K. war against Iraq in 2003,
could trigger an upheaval in Pakistan, with conceivable turmoil in
Saudi Arabia and other Moslem countries. It could also help produce
a dangerous escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, already at
a state of white-hot intensity, whose expansion could engulf the
Middle East in flames.
Thus, while it is reasonable to deem international terrorism a deadly
threat on a global scale and to take resolute action against terrorism,
what is required is an intelligent multifaceted and multilateral
response. This would require a diplomatic consensus that a global
campaign against terrorism is necessary which requires the arrest of
members of terrorist networks, the regulation of financial institutions
that allow funds to flow to terrorists, the implementation of national
security measures to protect citizens against terrorism, and the world-
wide criminalization of terrorist networks that sets international,
national, and local institutions against the terrorist threat. Some of
these measures have already begun and the conditions are present
to develop an effective and resolute global campaign against
terrorism.
There is a danger, however, that excessive unilateral American
military action would split a potential coalition, creating uncontrollable
chaos that could destroy the global economy and create an era of
apocalyptic war and misery such as Orwell evoked in 1984. We are
living in a very dangerous period and must be extremely careful and
responsible in appraising responses to the events of September 11
and other terrorist attacks bound to happen. This will require the
mobilization of publics on a local, national, and global level to oppose
both terrorism and militarism and to seek productive solutions to
the social problems that generate terrorism, as well as to terrorism
itself.
Consequently, while I would support a global campaign against
terrorism, I believe that we cannot depend on war or large-scale
military action to solve the problem of global terrorism. Terrorists
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should be criminalized and international and national institutions
should go after terrorist networks and those who support them with
the appropriate legal, financial, judicial, and political instruments.
Before and during Bush administration military intervention in
Afghanistan, an intelligent campaign was underway that had arrested
many participants and supporters of the bin Laden and other terror
networks, that had alerted publics throughout the world to the dangers
of terrorism, and that had created the conditions of possibility for a
global campaign against terror. But we need global movements and
institutions to oppose purely militarist attacks on terrorism and that
legitimate the suppression of democracy in the name of the war
against terrorism.
Another lesson of September 11 is that it is now totally appropriate
to be completely against terrorism, to use the term in the arsenal of
critical social theory, and to declare it unacceptable and indefensible
in the modern world. There was a time when it was argued that one
person’s “terrorism” was another person’s “national liberation
movement,” or “freedom fighter,” and that the term was thus an
ideological concept not to be used by politically and theoretically
correct discourse -– a position that Reuters purportedly continues
to follow.
In terms of modern/postmodern epistemological debates, I would
argue against absolutism and universalism and for providing a
contextual and historical account of terms like terrorism. There were
times in history when “terrorism” was an arguably defensible tactic
used by those engaged in struggles against fascism, such as in World
War II, or in national liberation struggles, such as in the movements
against oppressive European and later U.S. empire and colonialism.
In the current situation, however, when terrorism is a clear and
present danger to innocent civilians throughout the world, it seems
unacceptable to advocate, carry out, or defend terrorism against
civilian populations because of the lethality of modern weapons,
the immorality of indiscriminate crime, and the explosiveness of the
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present situation when terror on one side could unleash genocidal,
even species-cidal, terror as a retaliatory response.
It is therefore neither the time for terrorism nor reckless unilateral
military intervention, but for a global campaign against terrorism
that deploys all legal, political, and morally defensible means to
destroy the network of terrorists responsible for the September 11
events, but also that is for democracy. Such a global response would
put terrorist groups on warning that their activity will be strongly
opposed, and that “terrorism” will be construed as a moral and
political malevolence not to be accepted or defended. But a
progressive global campaign should also not accept militarism, the
erection of a police-military state, and the undermining of democracy
in the name of fighting terrorism.
Thus, while I would support a global campaign against terrorism,
especially the al Qaeda network, that could include military action
under UN or other global auspices, I would not trust U.S. unilateral
military action for reasons of U.S. failures in the region and its
sustained history of supporting the most reactionary social forces
(see Kellner 2003b). Indeed, one of the stakes of the current crisis,
and of globalization itself, is whether the U.S. empire will come to
dominate the world, or whether globalization will constitute a more
democratic, cosmopolitan, pluralistic, and just world, without
domination by hegemonic states or corporations. Now more than
ever global institutions and movements are needed to deal with
global problems and those who see positive potential in globalization
should renounce all national solutions to the problem of terrorism
and seek global ones. Consequently, while politicians like Bill Clinton
and Colin Powell have deemed terrorism “the dark side of
globalization,” it can also be seen as an unacceptable response to
misguided and destructive imperial national policies which themselves
must be transformed if a world without terror is possible.
Finally, this will require the anti-globalization movement to rethink
its nature, agenda, and goals. There may well be a “clash of
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civilizations” occurring today between the globalizing forces of
transnational capital and resistance to global capitalism by
heterogeneous configurations of individuals, groups, and social
movements. But in its first stages the movement against capitalist
globalization tended to be defined more by what it was against than
what it was for, hence, the common term “anti-globalization
movement.” A new social movement for the millennium must,
however, define itself by what it is for as well as against. In the
wake of September 11, I am suggesting that local, national, and
global democratic movements should be for democracy, peace,
environmentalism, and social justice and against war, militarism,
and terrorism, as well as the multiplicity of injustices that social
movements are currently fighting. Now, more than ever, we are
living in a global world and need new global movements and politics
to address global problems and achieve global solutions.
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Notes
1. This text is extracted from my study From 9/11 to Terror War:
Dangers of the Bush Legacy (Kellner 2003b) which continues work
done in my books The Persian Gulf TV War (Kellner 1992), Grand
Theft 2000 (Kellner 2001) and media spectacle (Kellner 2003a). I first
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presented the analysis in this project at the University of Kansas a couple
of weeks after the September 11 attacks and thank the Department of
Sociology for the invitation and a lively discussion. I then began writing
up the analysis and presenting it on my Web-site, producing an
experiment in writing contemporary history as it evolved, thus
circulating a first-draft on the Internet with weekly updates and revision.
Thanks to Rhonda Hammer and Richard Kahn for continuous support
and critical analysis of my September 11 studies and to Kahn for
administering the Web-site.
2. Fukujama’s 1992 book was an expansion of a 1989 article
published in the conservative journal The National Interest. His texts
generated a tremendous amount of controversy and were seen by some
as a new dominant ideology proclaiming the triumph of Western ideals
of capitalism and democracy over all of their opponents. With a quasi-
Hegelian gloss, Fukuyama proclaimed the victory of the Ideas of neo-
Liberalism and the “end of history,” and his work prompted both
skepticism (“it ain’t over, til its over”) and impassioned critique. If
terrorism and the Bush administration militarism soon pass from the
historical scene and a neo-liberal globalization driven by market
capitalism and democracy returns to become the constitutive force of
the new millennium, Fukuyama would end up being vindicated after all.
But in the current conflictual state of the world, his views appear off
the mark and put in question by the present situation.
3. Ali also notes (2002: 282f) that after the September 11 attacks,
Huntington modified his “clash of civilization” thesis to describe the
post Cold War era as an “age of “Muslim wars,” with Muslims fighting
each other, or their specific enemies (see Huntington essay in
Newsweek, Special Davos Edition (Dec-Jan. 2001-2). As Ali maintains,
besides being a highly questionable overview of the present age, it
contradicts his previous model, reducing Huntington’s thought to
incoherency.
4. For an astute analysis of the different senses of Jihad and a sharp
critique of the Islamic terrorists’ distortions of Islam, see Raschid 2002
and Ahmed 2003.
5. I provide my own historical and theoretical account of the
background to the events of September 11 in this chapter. Put abstractly,
such a theory would combine the Hegelian-Marxian perspectives of a
globalized world and the vicissitudes of capitalism and the contemporary
era with concrete historical study of specific events, like the September
11 terrorist acts, and the lessons for contemporary social theory and
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democratic politics. It would combine historical, political, economic,
and cultural analysis in a multiperspectivist model that eschews
reductionistism and simplistic monocasual models. In the light of the
importance of the media in the construction of the September 11
spectacle and subsequent Terror War, I also employ the tools of cultural
studies and media critique.
6. In addition to Johnson 2000 that I am utilizing to provide a
conceptual overview of the concept of blowback and to interpret the
September 11 terrorist acts, I am also drawing upon a series of studies
of U.S. foreign policy and Afghanistan, including Rashid 2001; Cooley
2000; Kepel 2002; Achbar 2002; and Vidal 2003. I also draw upon Mary
Ann Weaver, “Blowback,” Atlantic Monthly (May 1996), available at
www.theatlantic.com/issues/96may/blowback.htm; a collection of
articles contextualizing the events at The Nation web site, especially
Dilip Hiro, “The Cost of an Afghan ‘Victory,’” at www.thenation.com;
articles collected at www.counterpoint.com; and a variety of other books
and articles that I will cite as I proceed.
7. See Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, “The Price. Was it
Really Worth it, Mrs. Albright?“ Counterpoint, September 26, 2001.
See their archive for useful daily postings on the current crisis at http:/
/www.counterpunch.org/wtcarchive.html.
8. The 1998 Le Monde interview with Brzezinski is posted October
8, 2001 at http://www.counterpunch.org/wtcarchive.html. For a full
account of the background of the Brezezinski-Carter decision to
intervene in Afghanistan politics and the Soviet response, see Cooley
2000: 9ff.
9. Gilles Kepel claims that the name “Al Qaeda” emerged around
1986 when bin Laden began making a data bank of members of the Jihad
network, with Al Qaeda signifying “the base” (2002, 314); on the bin
Laden network, see also Brisard and Dasquie 2002.
10. According to one account, it was “irrational hatred” of Sudan
by the Clinton administration that prevented the West from gaining access
to Sudan’s detailed files on Al Qaeda, which they were reportedly willing
to share with the West, but which were repeatedly refused; see David
Rose, “Resentful west spurned Sudan’s key terror files,” Guardian, Sept.
30, 2001 and “The Osama Files,” Vanity Fair (Jan. 2002: 64ff). Rose
especially blames Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who
reportedly blocked the FBI from gaining the Sudan files, on the grounds
that Sudan was a “terrorist state.” Three days later, the Clinton
administration bombed Sudan in retaliation for the Al Qaeda bombings
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of U.S. embassies in Africa. A Clinton administration member, Gayle
Smith, however, claims that the Sudanese were not serious about sharing
their intelligence files and did not provide any useful information on
the bin Laden group (see Los Angeles Times (Dec. 7, 2001: B15). In his
2003 memoirs, Sidney Blumental claims that Clinton wanted to more
aggressively fight bin Laden and terrorism, waging “a mostly secret war
that was largely screened from the public.” According to Blumenthal,
FBI director Louis Freeh’s “hostility to the White House dictated his
lack of cooperation with the war against bin Laden.” Blumenthal claims
that Clinton planned to follow up the cruise missiles on Al Qaeda and
wanted to drop Special Ops troops into the mountains of Afghanistan in
a surprise attack, but the Pentagon blocked the plan, saying such an attack
would be too risky. A twisted, tortured tale of failed U.S. policy in the
region remains to be told.
11. On the background of the Unocal pipeline project, see Rashid
2001, Chapters 12 and 13. In the Southeast Asian press, there have been
speculations that the U.S. policy in Afghanistan under Bush II was to
stabilize the country under Taliban rule to enable the Unocal-corporation
to build a gas pipe-line across Afghanistan and exploit its potential natural
gas and oil resources. See Ranjit Devrag who writes:
Where the “great game” in Afghanistan was once about czars
and commissars seeking access to the warm water ports of the
Persian Gulf, today it is about laying oil and gas pipelines to
the untapped petroleum reserves of Central Asia. According to
testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives in March
1999 by the conservative think tank Heritage Foundation,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan together
have 15 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The same
countries also have proven gas deposits totaling not less than
nine trillion cubic meters. Another study by the Institute for
Afghan Studies placed the total worth of oil and gas reserves in
the Central Asian republics at around U.S.$3 trillion at last
year’s prices.
Not only can Afghanistan play a role in hosting pipelines
connecting Central Asia to international markets, but the country
itself has significant oil and gas deposits. During the Soviets’
decade-long occupation of Afghanistan, Moscow estimated
Afghanistan’s proven and probable natural gas reserves at around
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five trillion cubic feet and production reached 275 million cubic
feet per day in the mid-1970s. But sabotage by anti-Soviet
mujahideen (freedom fighters) and by rival groups in the civil
war that followed Soviet withdrawal in 1989 virtually closed
down gas production and ended deals for the supply of gas to
several European countries.
Natural gas production and distribution under Afghanistan’s
Taliban rulers is the responsibility of the Afghan Gas Enterprise
which, in 1999, began repair of a pipeline to Mazar-i-Sharif
city. Afghanistan’s proven and probable oil and condensate
reserves were placed at 95 million barrels by the Soviets. So
far, attempts to exploit Afghanistan’s petroleum reserves or
take advantage of its unique geographical location as a
crossroads to markets in Europe and South Asia have been
thwarted by the continuing civil strife.
In 1998, the California-based UNOCAL, which held 46.5
percent stakes in Central Asia Gas (CentGas), a consortium
that planned an ambitious gas pipeline across Afghanistan,
withdrew in frustration after several fruitless years. The pipeline
was to stretch 1,271km from Turkmenistan’s Dauletabad fields
to Multan in Pakistan at an estimated cost of $1.9 billion. An
additional $600 million would have brought the pipeline to
energy-hungry India. From OnLine Asia Times, October 6,
2001 (http://atimes.com/global-econ/CJ06Dj01.html).
After the collapse of the Enron corporation in Fall 2001, it was reported
that one of its many projects was promotion of the Unocal oil and gas
pipeline across Afghanistan; see the documents assembled in
www.bushwatch.com and note 19 below.
12. See Brewton 1992: 221ff; Beatty and Gwynne 1993; Hatfield
2000: 55-56; and Brisard and Dasquie 2002. According to Hatfield
(2000: 56), after Bath’s shady business deals were exposed, Bush denied
ever doing business with Bath, with whom he had served in the Texas
National Guard and was reportedly good friends. But inspection of later
court papers revealed that Bath indeed invested in Bush’s Arbusto oil
company, along with the bin Laden family. Bush Senior has also had
longtime relations with members of the bin Laden family and other Saudis
who provided money to the bin Laden network. For Bath’s colorful story,
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including business and bank scandals and illegal support for the contras,
and alleged recruitment into the CIA by George H.W. Bush, see Brewton
1992. BBS reported as well on bin Laden investment in Bush’s oil
company on November 7, 2001 and Bush administration orders to U.S.
specialagent to back off the bin Laden family and Saudi royals after
Bush became president; see the summary and detailed reporting in “U.S.
agents told: Back off bin Laden,” smh.com.au, Nov. 7, 2001.
13. Sally Slate’s explosive column is available, http://
www.onlinejournal.com/Commentary/Slate103001/slate103001.html;
the PBS Frontline commentary is at http://www.pbs. org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/binladen/who/family.html. An editor’s note was added
to the Frontline report cited above stating: “The above paragraph is
inaccurate. Salem bin Laden was piloting a light aircraft, not a BAC 1–
11, when he crashed. As for ‘secret Paris meetings between U.S. and
Iranian emissaries’ in October 1980, such meetings have never been
confirmed.” For sources that claim that such meetings took place and
that George H.W. Bush was involved in the negotiations, see the sources
in note 16 below. For the official bin Laden family position that Osama
is an outcast, see Michael Moss, “Bin Laden Family Strives to Re-
establish Its Reputation,” New York Times (Oct. 28, 2001). A BBC report,
however, indicated that several members of the bin Laden family were
connected with groups suspected of supporting and financing terrorist
networks (see see the summary and detailed reporting in “U.S. agents
told: Back off bin Laden,” smh.com.au, Nov. 7, 2001).
14. On the October Surprise, see Sick 1990 and the documents
assembled by Robert Parry in www.consortiumnews.com.
15. See the assembled documents from various sources including
the Wall Street Journal and New York Times that document the elder
Bush’s connection with the Carlyle group at www.bushwatch.com, as
well as Oliver Burkeman and Julian Borger, “The ex-president’s club,”
Guardian (October 31, 2001); Dan Briody, “Caryle’s way. Making a
mint inside ‘the iron triangle’ of defense, government, and industry,”
Red Herring, Jan. 8, 2002; and Tim Shorrock, “Crony capitalism Goes
Global.” The Nation (April 1, 2002: 11-16. The bin Laden family sold
their Carlyle fund interests after September 11 and members of the
family in the U.S. fled the country by private jet following the September
11 terror acts and the Bush and bin Laden family connections became a
source of embarrassment to the Bush family that so far has not been
systematically explored by the media.
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16. See note 13 above for the Sally Slate source; the tape of Saudis
clerics visiting bin Laden that was found in Afghanistan and released to
great fanfare and controversy in December 2001 documents the strong
support for bin Laden in Saudi Arabia, an issue I discuss later.
17. See Greg Palast, “FBI and U.S. Spy Agents Say Bush Spiked bin
Laden Probes Before September 11.” The Guardian (Nov. 7, 2001).
Palast’s article is collected on his home page that has a lot of other
interesting reports on Bush administration activities; see
www.gregpalast.com and the collection of his articles in Palast 2002.
18. See Wayne Madsen, “Afghanistan, the Taliban, and the Bush Oil
Team” who claims that Afghanistan interim president Hamid Karzai was
a top adviser to the Unocal Corporation interested in the Central Asian
Gas pipeline, that Enron did the feasibility study for the project, that
Cheney’s Halliburton company was set to do the construction work,
and that the Bush administration top representative in Afghanistan today,
Zalymay Zhalilzad, had also been a Unocal adviser and see member of
the Bush administration GOP (Grand Oil Plan) (see democrats.com
[January 2002] and hhtp://globalresearch.ca/articles/MAD201A.html.
19. Some critics are skeptical that creation of an oil pipeline across
Afghanistan is a major motivation for the Bush administration’s Terror
War policy. See, for instance, “No War for Oil!” The American Prospect
(August 12, 2002): 27-30. While it would be a mistake to reduce Bush
administration policy to serving oil industry interests, there is no doubt
but that the oil-obsessed Bushites have long been viewing the prospects
of controlling Caspian Sea basin oil and natural gas. Moreover, since
the Afghanistan invasion, as I note later in this study, U.S. bases have
been built throughout the area, deals have been made with the
Afghanistan and Pakistan government for oil pipelines to be built that
follow the original Unical/Enron plans, and one imagines that the
ultimate insider/realist legitimation for the extent of the U.S. military
involvement in the region is to gain access to oil supplies in case Persian
Gulf supplies are threatened or become depleted. For an excellent
account of the role of oil “resource” politics and how the drive to control
oil supplies has been fueling U.S. post-Cold War policy, see Klare 2001.
20. In “Ashcroft Knew,” Bruce Shapiro names Ashcroft “the official
responsible for the most dramatic failures of September 11” (Salon,
May 23, 2002). Ashcroft will indeed emerge as one of the villains of
this book, in part because of his stunning incompetence and failures to
address the dangers of terrorism due to his fanatic obsession to push
through a rightwing law and order agenda. But Ashcroft also carried out
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the most systematic assault on civil liberties in U.S. history and emerges
as a clear and present danger to constitutional democracy. Yet in my
reading, it is the collective responsibility of the Bush administration to
fail to heed warnings of imminent terror attacks and its systematically
carrying out policies that made them more likely, an argument I expand
in Chapter 1 and elsewhere in this book.
21. The Feinstein memo is found at www.senate.gov/~feinstein/
Releases02/attacks.htm).
22. See CBS News, “New Terror Task Force. Cheney To Lead at
Terrorist Threats to U.S.,” May 8, 2001. A June 30, 2001 CNN report
headlined “Cheney is point man for administration” noting that Cheney
would be in charge of task forces on three major issues: energy, Global
warming, and domestic terrorism.” We know that Cheney concentrated
on energy issues, to the detriment of paying attention to terrorism, and
there should be an inquiry into what he did and did not do as head of the
Bush administration anti-terrorism task force. A www.disasterrelief.org
Web-site on May 11 also posted a report that states that: “Bush asked
Vice President Dick Cheney to lead the task force, which will explore
how attacks against U.S. citizens or personnel at home and overseas
may be detected and stopped.” To prevent future terror attacks on the
U.S., it would thus be highly important to see exactly what Cheney did
or did not do and address the problems revealed. See discussions of
Cheney, Enron, and the oil industries in 9.2, 11.3, and elsewhere in this
study.
23. Brinkley elaborated his position in a forum at Columbia
University on October 5, 2001; see http://www.columbia.edu/ cu/
news/01/10/historical_reflection_9_11.html.
24. For Virilio, every technology has its accident that accompanies
it, so the airplane’s accident is the crash, the automobile a wreck, and a
ship its sinking. For Virilio, the accident the Internet faces is “the
accident of accidents,” as he calls it, the entire collapse of the global
system of communication and information, and thus the global economy.
On Virilio, see Kellner 1999.
25. Human Rights Watch has released a report that has documented
how a wide spectrum of countries have used the war against terrorism
to legitimate intensified repression of its domestic opponents and
military action against foreign adversaries. See http://www.hrw.org/press/
2002/02/usmil0215.htm
